The New Textualism, Progressive
Constitutionalism, and Abortion Rights
A Reply to Jeffrey Rosen
Neil S. Siegel*
Jack Balkin's Living Originalism deserves all of the attention that it has
received.' It is one of the most important works of constitutional theory in
recent years, and it is likely to inspire much theorizing by others.2
Jeffrey Rosen's contribution to this symposium on Balkin's book is
brimming with insights.' In clear and concise prose, Rosen usefully
categorizes the different kinds of progressives and conservatives who
occupy today's political and legal landscape. He wisely counsels legal
progressives not to run from constitutional text and history where those
forms of authority can help to decide constitutional questions. He correctly
advises that possessing the "right" constitutional methodology is no
substitute for defending a substantive constitutional vision. And he makes
a thought-provoking case for the present pertinence of Justice Louis
Brandeis's approach to judging. It is no wonder that Rosen is a leading
public intellectual about the subject of the U.S. Supreme Court.
In this Essay, I offer a few thoughts in response to Rosen's contribution.
I will first focus on what he writes about the "new textualism." I will then
reply to what he intimates about the continuing validity of Roe v. Wade.4
In short, I will argue that Rosen offers progressives little reason to accept
the new textualism or to reject Roe in the name of legal fidelity.
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1.

JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).

2. Balkin provoked me sufficiently that I was moved to review the book elsewhere. See Neil S.
Siegel, Jack Balkin's Rich Historicism and Diet Originalism: Health Benefits and Risks for the
ConstitutionalSystem, Ill MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
3. Jeffrey Rosen, How New Is the New Textualism?, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 43 (2013).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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I. THE NEWNESS AND TEXTUALISM OF THE "NEW TEXTUALISM"
In Rosen's view, Living Originalism "represents a growing
constitutional movement among liberal activists and legal scholars that
James Ryan has called the "new textualism." 5 "The movement," according
to Rosen, "seeks to beat conservatives at their own game by insisting that
arguments about the text, history, and structure of the Constitution often
lead to liberal rather than conservative results."6 Rosen adds that the
ultimate "success or failure of the New Textualism will depend on the
ability of liberals to stop squabbling about constitutional methodology and
to agree on the substantive values that they believe the Constitution
protects."' These passages, provocative though they are, seem problematic
to me both descriptively and normatively.
As a jurisprudential matter, it is not apparent that there is such a thing as
the "new textualism." The phrase suggests something methodologically
novel or distinct. There is, however, nothing methodologically novel or
distinct about academic constitutional lawyers-whatever their ideological
bent-who make textual, structural, and historical (whether pre- or postratification) arguments in interpreting the Constitution. What is more, I
doubt that any self-described new textualist means to rule out of bounds
doctrinal arguments and the institution of stare decisis, which is essential
if decisions endorsed by new textualists are to constrain Justices who are
not new textualists. The only standard method of constitutional argument
that I have yet to mention invokes the constitutional authority of the
American ethos, which often works hand in hand with other interpretive
modalities.' So, in substance and in practice, the new textualism seems to
me more appropriately described as fidelity to the Constitution that Chief
Justice John Marshall interpreted in McCulloch v. Maryland.' Akhil Reed
Amar, whom Rosen justly celebrates, relied heavily on McCulloch in his
defense of the constitutionality of health care reform."o I do not see what
the idea of a "new textualism" adds to the old Marshallianism. It is not
new, and it is not focused primarily on the text.
Normatively, I fear that any progressive approach to constitutional
interpretation (whatever one chooses to call it) will not succeed if the point
of the exercise is primarily "to beat conservatives at their own game"" by
insisting that various constitutional arguments often lead to outcomes that
5. Rosen, supra note 3, at 44.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 45.
8. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819) (describing national
borders that do not yet exist).
9. Id.
10. Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law Working
Paper No. 228, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=1 856506.
I1. Rosen, supra note 3, at 44.
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progressives favor. Just as the use of originalism for political purposes by
some on the right has undermined originalism's claims to legal authority, I
doubt things will end well for left-leaning activists and scholars if they
view constitutional law principally "[a]s a strategic matter"l 2 that requires
"engaging conservatives on their own turf."' 3 To be clear, I am not so
naive or irresponsible as to believe that outcomes are irrelevant in
evaluating constitutional arguments. But if outcomes are all (or almost all)
that matter to the activist or scholar, then one is not faithfully discharging
one's legal responsibilities, and one may end up losing credibility in the
eyes of those who are potentially persuadable.
One may lose credibility for at least two reasons. First, one will
probably make some relatively weak and unconvincing legal arguments.
Consider, for example, how a results-oriented practitioner or scholar is
likely to deploy arguments based on American history and tradition. As
every historian knows, history is often a notoriously mixed bag. It is
delusional to think that historical arguments almost always validate the
values of today's progressives, moderates, or conservatives. America was
and is too diverse a place for any such luck (or misfortune).
Second, one may lack the conviction necessary to persuade others. I
myself do not think that progressives should be asking themselves how to
beat conservatives at their own game. I instead think that progressives
should be asking themselves how to think of the practice of constitutional
adjudication as something other than a game-how they can authentically
believe in the soundness of their own constitutional arguments. Such
conviction is a powerful thing. Those who possess it can confidently and
publicly assert their constitutional arguments as law. Armed with
conviction, one may not get all of the outcomes that one desires, because
one will inevitably end up having to make concessions in the name of
legal fidelity. But, ironically, one may secure more favorable outcomes
than one would obtain if obtaining them were the only objective.14
A distinct normative concern is raised by Rosen's assertion that the
ultimate "success or failure of the new textualism will depend on the
ability of liberals to stop squabbling about constitutional methodology and
to agree on the substantive values that they believe the Constitution
protects."" This statement renders puzzling Rosen's enthusiastic embrace
of the new textualism. If substantive constitutional values are primary and

12. Id. at 44.
13. Id. at 47.
14. For example, some legal progressives may not favor the constitutional limits on the tax power
that the U.S. Supreme Court imposed in National FederationofIndependent Business v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012). But the availability of those limits may have informed the decision of Chief Justice
Roberts to uphold the Affordable Care Act's minimum coverage provision under the Taxing Clause.
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Foreword:Academic Influence on the Court, 98 VA. L. REV. 1189 (2012).
15. Rosen, supra note 3, at 44-45.
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constitutional methodology is secondary to Rosen, then it is not clear why
he champions a movement seemingly inspired by the thought that what
progressives need most is a more powerful interpretive methodology (or
justificatory rhetoric?). The "older generation of liberal legal scholars"l 6
referenced by Rosen tends to believe that causation runs in the opposite
direction-that if progressives get their substantive constitutional values
straight and mobilize successfully to achieve them, then methodological
approaches will be pluralistic, and questions of appropriate legal form in
particular settings will tend to take care of themselves." Rosen seems to
agree with both points. But they appear to be in tension, so it is not clear
how he can have it both ways.
II. THE LAWFULNESS OF THE ABORTION DECISIONS

Rosen believes that some progressive legal scholars "strenuously
resist[]" the new textualism because they "fear that addressing
conservative Justices in terms they can understand will make it harder to
defend landmark Warren and Burger Court liberal precedents such as Roe
v. Wade."" Rosen calls Roe the "elephant in the room" that "explains
much of the liberal legal establishment's skepticism" about the new
textualism.' 9 I suspect that Rosen misdiagnoses progressive resistance for
the reasons offered above: it is more likely that these progressives view
the progressive legal movement as already possessing sufficient methods
and labels.
In any event, I will now consider-far too briefly-whether embracing
the new textualism (or the old Marshallianism) would oblige one to
repudiate Roe and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.20 Rosen does not explicitly counsel progressives to call for Roe's
and Casey's abandonment, but he intimates as much. 21 He calls "Balkin's
textualist defense of Roe. . . the least convincing part of his book." 22 He
contrasts the new textualism, which he endorses, with "Roe-style living
constitutionalism," 23 which he seems to reject. And in the same paragraph,
with Roe apparently in mind, he writes the following:
16.
17.

Id. at 44.
See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE

CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25,31 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) ("Americans mobilize

because they care about constitutional ideals. It is exactly backward to argue that the most important
need of progressives is for a method of constitutional interpretation.").
18. Rosen, supra note 3, at 44.
19. Id. at 48.
20. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
21. In the past, Rosen has more clearly stated his view that Roe was wrongly decided. See WHAT
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 170-86 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (dissenting opinion of Jeffrey Rosen).

22.
23.

Rosen, supra note 3, at 48.
Id. at 49.
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[T]o the degree that Balkin and other new textualists refuse to
recognize that textualist arguments have their limits, and that not
every liberal policy goal can be justified in constitutional terms,
they diminish the new textualism's appeal as a principled
framework for structuring political and legal debate.24
For Rosen, apparently, Roe is an example of "free-floating textualism,"
which "makes it harder to criticize conservatives for being similarly
results-oriented when they manipulate the levels of abstraction of
constitutional text and history in order to justify their own preferred
policies."25
If Roe is as lawless as Rosen seems to think, then perhaps he should
simply say so. Whatever the reason for his diffidence, the implication of
what he writes is evident. Rosen, however, does not really defend his
intimations. Nor does he explain why his criticisms of Roe do not
similarly condemn other landmark Supreme Court decisions protecting
liberty and equality, including the Court's invalidation of compulsory
sterilization in Skinner v. Oklahoma,26 its declaration of a right to
contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut27 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,28 and
29
its invalidation of anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia.
I will focus on Loving because it may seem like the easiest case for
Rosen to distinguish. It is not so easy. Just as the Loving Court relied on
both the explicit, textual authority of the Equal Protection Clause and an
unenumerated fundamental right that was supported by tradition only if
conceived at a relatively high level of abstraction," so too may the
abortion right be defended in both ways. Just as the textual basis for
Loving did not render the equality right protected by the Court obvious or
uncontroversial for most of the post-ratification history of the Equal

24. Id. at 49.
25. Id.
26. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
29. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's statutory ban on miscegenation because it (1)
unconstitutionally discriminated and subordinated based on race and (2) violated the fundamental right
to marry, even though the right had traditionally been limited to same-race couples).
30. In Casey, Justice Scalia declined to acknowledge the second ground on which the Loving
Court invalidated the Virginia law. See 505 U.S. at 980 n.l (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
suggestion ... that adherence to tradition would require us to uphold laws against interracial marriage
is entirely wrong. Any tradition in that case was contradicted by a text-an Equal Protection Clause
that explicitly establishes racial equality as a constitutional value."). Perhaps the implication of
Scalia's response is that there is no fundamental right to marry, or that the fundamental right to marry
extends only to same-race couples. Both assertions contradict our law, and I doubt Rosen subscribes to
either of them. Moreover, neither the plain meaning nor the original understanding of the text of the
Equal Protection Clause is what Justice Scalia asserts it to be. See Michael Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881,
1919-20 (1995) (noting the distinctions among civil, social, and political equality drawn by the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment). Scalia did not explain why nondecisive text trumps tradition
when government discriminates based on race but not when it restricts access to abortion.
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Protection Clause, so too the abortion right need not be obvious or
uncontroversial in that history in order to be textually grounded. Of course
it is contestable whether the equal protection framework compels
protection of the abortion right. But the same was true of racial
segregation and bans on miscegenation," just as it is true of many other
rights protected under equal protection.3 2
To be clear, I would ground the abortion right in both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clauses. The protections offered by
these clauses are often overlapping, given the intimate relationship
between constitutional equality and constitutional liberty. I focus on the
Equal Protection Clause here not because I find liberty arguments for the
abortion right unpersuasive, but because they are probably more familiar.33
Why, exactly, are there insufficient interpretive resources to defend Roe
and-more to the point-Casey? After all, Rosen insists that "the new
textualism is broad enough to embrace all the different strands of legal
liberalism" in existence today, and he usefully points out that these groups
are numerous and diverse.34 They include Great Society liberals; liberals
who seek equal citizenship stature for women, homosexuals, and racial
and ethnic minorities; neo-progressives; civil libertarians; and economic
populists.,,
Because text by itself does not decide the constitutionality of many
questions, including bans on racial intermarriage, the problem cannot be
that the text of the Equal Protection Clause does not clearly decide the
abortion issue one way or the other. Surely, a right to abortion is no more
difficult to justify textually than the right to marry or the right to travel. 3 6
What is more, originalist and traditionalist arguments are hardly decisive
in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in the area of gender equality
or racial equality. For example, the Justices, including the self-described
conservative "originalists," debate the original meaning of Brown v. Board
of Education,37 not the Fourteenth Amendment." And unless one adopts

31. See Klarman, supra note 30, at 1919-20 (noting "the conventional view that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment distinguished civil from political and social rights, and barred racial
discrimination only with regard to the former," and further noting that "[j]ury service, like voting, was
plainly deemed at the time to constitute a political right and interracial marriage a social one").
32. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
33. For a discussion of the relationship between liberty and equality arguments for the abortion
right, see generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, The Equality Argument for Abortion Rights, 60
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE (forthcoming 2013).
34. Rosen, supra note 3, at 52.
35. Id. at 53.
36. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry as a fundamental right); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (same); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel as a
fundamental right).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
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Balkin's idiosyncratic view (which Rosen seems to resist) that the original
semantic meaning of "the equal protection of the laws" is the same as its
contemporary meaning, 3 9 there appears to be no good originalist or
traditionalist argument for striking down state laws that prohibit
miscegenation.4 0 Almost no one has even tried to make such an
argument.4 1
As an interpretive community, we do not worry about the
constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws anymore because they are no
longer politically controversial-not because text, structure, and history
42
give us the answer that we want as a matter of political morality. Rosen
does not assert that those who embrace the new textualism must be
prepared to live with anti-miscegenation laws (or, for that matter, racial
discrimination in jury service and access to public facilities). 43 So it is not
immediately evident why text, structure, and history impose
insurmountable barriers in the area of abortion rights. One thing we know
for sure about the text of the Equal Protection Clause is that it is not
limited to racial discrimination, as is Section One of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
When text and structure do not decide a constitutional question, and
when originalism and traditionalism are widely regarded as not controlling
interpretation of a constitutional provision, mediating principles (Balkin
calls them "underlying principles"") become particularly important. Such
principles are not part of the text; rather, they underlie it. They may be
needed to apprehend and apply the text. Often in constitutional
interpretation, participants ascribe principles to the text in order to make
sense of it. These principles are often informed by historical analysis, but
they are not determined by original meanings or post-ratification
traditions. On the contrary, mediating principles may be anti-traditionalist
in orientation.45
39.

See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 231 (2011). For an argument that

Balkin's originalism is originalist mostly in name, see generally Siegel, supra note 2.
40. See Klarman, supra note 30, at 1919-20.
41. For the only example I know of, see Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism
and Loving v. Virginia, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1393.
42. Of course, anti-miscegenation laws, like Brown itself, used to be intensely controversial. For
an account of how long it took for Brown to achieve canonical status, see generally Brad Snyder, How
the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383 (2000).
43. See Klarman, supranote 30.
44. See BALKIN, supra note 1, at 260.
45. In the area of equal protection, examples of mediating principles include (1) the nineteenth
century distinctions among civil, social, and political equality; (2) the anticlassification principle
espoused by contemporary race conservatives; (3) the antisubordination principle espoused by
contemporary race progressives; and (4) the antibalkinization principle espoused by contemporary race
moderates. For discussion of the first principle, see Klarman, supra note 30. For discussion of the
latter three, see Neil S. Siegel, Race-ConsciousStudent Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration,
and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781 (2006); Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial
Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959 (2008); and Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to

62

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 25:55

What is the basic, animating purpose of the Equal Protection Clause?
What work is it charged with doing in the American constitutional
system? A persuasive answer to this question will focus on combatting
various forms of group subordination in addition to various forms of group
classification. One cannot make full sense of the meaning of the Civil
War, the first and second Reconstructions, the women's movement, and
fights over gay rights today without taking into account the
antisubordination understanding of constitutional equality-that is, the
view that the Equal Protection Clause presumptively prohibits
governmental practices that reflect or reinforce the inferior social status of
historically excluded groups.4 6
To take just one timely example, consider facially race-neutral laws that
have the race-conscious purpose of expanding economic or educational
opportunities for racial and ethnic minorities. Instances include programs
that use various proxies for race in order to enhance minority business
opportunities,4' race-conscious attendance zones that reduce the racial
identifiability of public schools,48 and affirmative action admission
programs that use "percent plans," which rely on racial segregation at the
high school level to produce racial integration in public universities. 4 9 At
least some (although probably not all) race conservatives on the U.S.
Supreme Court do not regard such laws as triggering strict scrutiny."
There is no discriminatory purpose under Washington v. Davis5 ' and
PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney52 because the perceived objective is to
Antibalkanization:An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278
(2011).
46. For example, the seminal gay rights case of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), was
technically a substantive due process decision, but the Court continuously appealed to values of
substantive equality. See, e.g., id. at 578 (writing that the petitioners "are entitled to respect for their
private lives," and that "[t]he State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime").
47. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("A State can, of course, act 'to undo the effects of past discrimination' in many
permissible ways that do not involve classification by race. In the particular field of state contracting,
for example, it may adopt a preference for small businesses, or even for new businesses-which would
make it easier for those previously excluded by discrimination to enter the field. Such programs may
well have racially disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race.").
48. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("School boards may pursue
the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means,
including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of
the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and
faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.").
49. In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, No. 11-345, the percent-plan component of the
university admissions program is not being challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
50. See supranotes 47-49.
51. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
52. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("'[D]iscriminatory purpose' ... implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.").
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help racial and ethnic minorities, not to harm whites. 3
And yet the Court would surely strike down, by a vote of 9-0, facially
race-neutral laws that had the race-conscious purpose of increasing
economic or educational opportunities for whites or reducing racial
integration. The Court would interpret facially neutral laws designed to
help whites as a racial group or to prevent racial integration as designed to
harm racial and ethnic minorities. In other words, the Court would apply a
zero-sum logic to laws intended to benefit whites or to prevent racial
integration, but would likely not apply a zero-sum logic to laws aimed at
expanding opportunities for racial minorities or integrating workforces and
universities. The Court would conclude that laws designed to prevent
integration are actually designed to harm minorities, but that laws
designed to promote integration are not designed to harm whites as a racial
group. An anticlassification approach to the Equal Protection Clause
cannot make any sense of this asymmetry. An antisubordination approach
can.
If this is right, then a key constitutional question in the abortion context
is whether there is a close connection between restrictions on access to
abortion and the enforced inequality of women-whether abortion54
restrictive regulations may be shaped, at least in part, by gender bias.
Progressive legal scholars have identified links between prohibitions on
abortion and the perpetuation of the sex-role stereotypes of the separate
spheres tradition-the dyadic structuring of sex roles in which men are
expected to perform as breadwinners and women are expected to perform
as economically dependent caregivers. 5 These scholars have shown the
53. Some race conservatives have begun to challenge this understanding of Davis and Feeney
because they want to attack disparate impact liability under Title Vll. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano,
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). But they would have to overrule Davis and
Feeney in order to do so. Currently, facially neutral laws that aim to help racial minorities or promote
racial integration do not contravene Davis and Feeney. Percent plans pose a problem for Justice Scalia
and other race conservatives who target disparate impact liability. They cannot argue simultaneously
that percent plans are a less restrictive alternative to facial racial classifications and that such plans are
unconstitutional because they are designed to help racial minorities.
54. That is not the only pertinent constitutional question. Another concerns potential infringement
of a pregnant woman's constitutional liberty.
55. For examples of work in the equality tradition written before Casey, see generally LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1353-59 (2d ed. 1990); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375
(1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Reva Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with
Special Reference to Pornography,Abortion and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992). For more
recent work, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Argumentsfor Reproductive Rights: Their
CriticalBasis and Evolving ConstitutionalExpression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 833-34 (2007) [hereinafler
Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments] (surveying equality arguments after Casey); WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD

HAVE

SAID:

THE

NATION'S

TOP

LEGAL

EXPERTS

REWRITE

AMERICA'S

MOST

CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (sex equality opinions by Jack Balkin, Reva
Siegel, and Robin West).
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various ways in which laws that withdraw from women control over the
timing of motherhood reflect not just concern for the unborn. While they
typically do reflect genuine concern to protect fetal life, they also reflect
and enforce traditional views about female sexuality outside the context of
marriage and procreation; traditional views about the propriety of a
pregnant woman's choosing to be a breadwinner instead of a caregiver;
and traditional views about the capacity of women to make autonomous
and momentous choices for themselves and their families. 56
Put differently, the abortion right is central not only to preserving
women's physical health, but also to protecting their ability to experience
sexual intimacy on terms of equality with men, to ensuring their own
economic well-being and that of their families, and to securing their
enjoyment of the same social status and dignity as men. These insights
explain why the Casey Court-at the very instant it reaffirmed
constitutional protection for the abortion right-poignantly wrote that a
pregnant woman's "suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to
insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our
culture."" This idea also underlies Justice Ginsburg's more recent
insistence for four Justices that "legal challenges to undue restrictions on
abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of
privacy; rather, they center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature."" Whereas Casey used
equality values to inform the meaning of the Due Process Clause, Justice
Ginsburg went further by deploying lines of precedent interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause.59 Both might have invoked-and a differently
composed Court may yet invoke-the explicit, textual authority of the
Equal Protection Clause itself.60
56. See Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments, supra note 55, at 817-22.
57. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
58. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); cf Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (asserting that differential
workplace leave policies for fathers and mothers "were not attributable to any differential physical
needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
members is women's work"); id. at 736 (quoting Congress's finding that the "prevailing ideology
about women's roles has . . . justified discrimination against women when they are mothers or
mothers-to-be").
59. In rejecting the Court's reliance on the woman-protective rationale for restricting access to
abortion, Justice Ginsburg appealed to the Court's equal protection jurisprudence in the area of sex
equality. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185 (comparing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908),
and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring), with United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542, n.12 (1996), and Calhfano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207
(1977)).
60. In Casey, Justices Blackmun and Stevens relied explicitly on the Equal Protection Clause. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) ("This assumption-that women can simply be forced to accept the 'natural' status
and incidents of motherhood-appears to rest upon a conception of women's role that has triggered
the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.").
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It may be possible to imagine a society in which restrictions on abortion
do not reflect and reinforce traditional sex-role stereotypes, just as it may
be possible to imagine an egalitarian, multicultural society in which
government-mandated racial segregation does not subordinate any racial
group. But neither accurately characterizes American society past or
present. In America, de jure racial segregation sounds only in the
inequality of people of color," and views about abortion are highly
correlated with views about the traditional family.62
In America, restrictions on abortion have much (although not all) to do
with views on how it is "natural" and appropriate for a woman to respond
to a pregnancy. If the two had little to do with each other, legislatures that
sought to coerce childbirth in the name of protecting life would bend over
backwards to provide material support for the women who are required to
bear-too often alone-the awesome physical, emotional, and financial
costs of pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing.6 3 Only by viewing
pregnancy and motherhood as the natural order of things can a
legislature dismiss these costs as modest in size and private in nature.
When abortion restrictions reflect or enforce the sex-role stereotypes of
the separate spheres tradition, such restrictions may violate the Equal
Protection Clause.64
To a significant extent, longstanding Supreme Court doctrine reflects
this understanding of the abortion right. There has been a constitutional
right to abortion in the United States for forty years, and the Court has
increasingly come to understand its sex-equality dimensions-as the
quotation above from Casey indicates. 65 The equal protection rationale for
the abortion right has come into focus only in recent years because the
Court in 1973 (when Roe was decided) had barely yet conceived of the
Equal Protection Clause as having anything to say about sex
discrimination.66 Since that time, the abortion right has repeatedly been
challenged and has repeatedly been reaffirmed by the Court. For four
decades now, many American women have relied on this right and have

61. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960).
62. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalismand Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 377 (2007) (defining "Roe rage" as "a broad-based social movement
hostile to legal efforts to secure the equality of women and the separation of church and state").
63. See generally Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of EqualProtection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992).
64. See Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist s New Approach to
Pregnancy Discriminationin Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1891-97 (2006).
65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of this doctrinal development, see
Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to Carhart, 70
OHIO ST. L.J. 1095 (2009).
66. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The
Court did not hold that sex classifications trigger heightened scrutiny for another three years. See
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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organized their lives around its availability."7 There is thus a very strong
doctrinal argument in favor of preserving Roe and Casey.
To be sure, justifying abortion rights under the Equal Protection Clause
requires one to engage Geduldig v. Aiello.68 But, as Reva Siegel has
argued elsewhere, 69 the conventional wisdom about Geduldig is incorrect.
The Geduldig Court did not hold that governmental regulation of
pregnancy never qualifies as a sex classification. Rather, the Geduldig
Court held that governmental regulation of pregnancy does not always
qualify as a sex classification. The Court acknowledged that "distinctions
involving pregnancy" might inflict "an invidious discrimination against
the members of one sex or the other."70 The Geduldig Court's use of the
term "invidious" is best read to reference what Wendy Williams' brief in
Geduldig used the term "invidious" to reference-namely, traditional sexrole stereotypes.7 '
Of course, this response is way too brief to qualify as a complete
constitutional defense of the abortion right. For one thing, I have not
discussed familiar liberty rationales for the right. For another thing, I have
not examined the state's interests in protecting fetal life, which Casey
accommodated to a greater extent than did Roe. But what I have written
suffices for my purposes here: if the abortion right is ultra vires because a
lack of decisive warrant in text, structure, and history trumps mediating
equality principles and legal doctrine, then so is much else that
progressives view as constitutional law. If the new textualism lacks the
interpretive resources to justify the abortion right, then neither can it
justify other core progressive constitutional commitments. Indeed,
abandoning Roe and Casey would be no mere concession that legal
progressives would make in the name of fidelity to law. Abandoning the
abortion right would entail a huge sacrifice of the very substantive
understanding of equality that binds together most progressive
understandings of equal citizenship in the areas of discrimination based on
race, national origin, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, and disability.72
67. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) ("[F]or two decades of
economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices
that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should fail.").
68. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Alternatively, one could try to show that Feeney's requirement of
discriminatory purpose is met when government prohibits abortion, but that would be difficult to do.
See supra note 52.
69. See Siegel, supra note 64, at 1891-97; see also Siegel & Siegel, supra note 65, at 1111-13;
Siegel & Siegel, supranote 33.
70. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
71. See Brief for Appellees at 38, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640) ("The
issue for courts is not whether pregnancy is, in the abstract, sui generis, but whether the legal treatment
of pregnancy in various contexts is justified or invidious. The 'gross, stereotypical distinctions
between the sexes' . . . are at the root of many laws and regulations relating to pregnancy.").
72. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, "Equal Citizenship Stature": Justice Ginsburg's Constitutional
Vision, 43 NEw ENG. L. REv. 799 (2010); Erik Eckholm, Push Expands for Legalizing Gay Marriage,
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The stakes are enormous. 73
And so: progressives proceed at their peril if they persuade themselves
that the abortion right can be abandoned with few collateral consequences
for progressive constitutional commitments. Like many such
commitments, the abortion right is textually grounded, infused with
antisubordination values, and supported by legal doctrine while
nonetheless remaining contestable and contested. True, the abortion right
is politically more controversial than some other progressive legal
commitments. But given the consistent, solid majority of Americans who
do not want to see Roe overturned,7 4 progressives who are politically
squeamish about defending Roe and Casey may have less to fear than they
imagine. What is more, by speaking law to the politicians and judges who
seek to end abortion rights in America, progressives (including Jeffrey
Rosen) would be standing up for other legal commitments that they rightly
champion-and rightly regard as possessing principled legal justification.

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at Al, A15 ("The most ardent opponents of same-sex marriage, led by
evangelical Christians and the Roman Catholic Church, have vowed to redouble their defense of
'natural marriage,' even comparing it to the continuing fight against legal abortion.").
73. The stakes are enormous as well for liberty rights the Court protects that are core progressive
commitments. See, e.g., supra notes 27, 28, 46 and accompanying text (discussing Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Lawrence).
74.

See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ROE V. WADE AT 40: MOST OPPOSE OVERTURNING ABORTION

DECISION (2003), available at http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Issues/Abortion/Roe
-v-wade-full.pdf ("More than six-in-ten (63%) say they would not like to see the court completely
overturn the Roe v. Wade decision . . . . Only about three-in-ten (29%) would like to see the ruling

overturned. These opinions are little changed from surveys conducted 10 and 20 years ago.").

